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Abstract
Background: A fundamental assumption in animal socio-ecology is that animals compete over limited resources.
This view has been challenged by the finding that individuals might cooperatively partition resources by “taking
turns”. Turn-taking occurs when two individuals coordinate their agonistic behaviour in a way that leads to an
alternating pattern in who obtains a resource without engaging in costly fights. Cooperative turn-taking has been
largely ignored in models of animal conflict and socio-ecological models that explain the evolution of social
behaviours based only on contest and scramble competition. Currently it is unclear whether turn-taking should be
included in socio-ecological models because the evolution of turn-taking is not well understood. In particular, it is
unknown whether turn-taking can evolve when fighting costs and assessment of fighting abilities are not fixed but
emerge from evolved within-fight behaviour. We address this problem with an evolutionary agent-based model.
Results: We found that turn-taking evolves for small resource values, alongside a contest strategy that leads to
stable dominance relationships. Turn-taking leads to egalitarian societies with unclear dominance relationships and
non-linear dominance hierarchies. Evolutionary stability of turn-taking emerged despite strength differences among
individuals and the possibility to evolve within-fight behaviour that allows good assessment of fighting abilities.
Evolutionary stability emerged from frequency-dependent effects on fitness, which are modulated by feedbacks
between the evolution of within-fight behaviour and the evolution of higher-level conflict strategies.
Conclusions: Our results reveal the impact of feedbacks between the evolution of within-fight behaviour and the
evolution of higher-level conflict strategies, such as turn-taking. Similar feedbacks might be important for the
evolution of other conflict strategies such as winner-loser effects or coalitions. However, we are not aware of any
study that investigated such feedbacks. Furthermore, our model suggests that turn-taking could be used by
animals to partition low value resources, but to our knowledge this has never been tested. The existence of turn-
taking might have been overlooked because it leads to societies with similar characteristics that have been
expected to emerge from scramble competition. Analyses of temporal interaction patterns could be used to test
whether turn-taking occurs in animals.
1. Background
A fundamental assumption in animal socio-ecology is that
animals compete with each other over limited resources
such as food or mates. Two basic forms of competition
are usually distinguished: scramble and contest [1]. Scram-
ble competition should occur when individuals are not
able to prevent others from accessing a resource. In con-
trast, contest competition occurs when individuals can
directly influence others’ access to a resource, e.g. by
winning fights over monopolizable resources. The form of
competition should affect how individuals interact with
each other, which in turn should determine the develop-
ment of social relationships and social structures in group
living animals [2]. This is a central assumption in concep-
tual socio-ecological models that have been developed for
primates [3-6]. In this framework, a high potential for con-
test competition within groups leads to despotic societies
with stable, unidirectional dominance relationships and
linear hierarchies. In contrast, when the potential for con-
test competition is low and individuals mainly compete via
scramble competition, egalitarian societies should emerge
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hierarchies.
The assumption that animals always use competitive
mechanisms to gain access to limited resources has been
challenged by Crowley [7], who discovered a potential
cooperative mechanism for this purpose. Crowley’ss t u d y
was based on a generalized hawk-dove game in which
individuals of different size repeatedly enter conflicts with
each other over a valuable resource. In each conflict two
individuals decide whether to play hawk (i.e., to escalate to
a costly fight) or dove (i.e. not to escalate), which deter-
mines whether the conflict is escalated to a costly fight. In
particular, Crowley considered conflict strategies that were
conditional on interactions in previous conflicts with the
same opponent. He found that two conditional strategies
evolved: a “contest strategy” and a “turn-taking strategy”.
The contest strategy resulted in stable dominance relation-
ships with fixed hawk and dove roles. The turn-taking
strategy resulted in alternating dominance interactions. In
each conflict, always one individual in a dyad played hawk
and the other played dove. Importantly, in each subse-
quent conflict between the same individuals both indivi-
duals switched their roles of playing hawk and dove. Thus,
in the long term, turn-taking resulted in the equal parti-
tioning of resources despite the fact that contest competi-
tion was possible. According to Noë’s [8] definition of
cooperation, turn-taking is a cooperative strategy because
it leads to net gain for both individuals in each dyad.
While the evolution of turn-taking has been investigated
in cooperation games [9,10], turn-taking has been usually
ignored in models that explored the evolution of conflict
strategies [11-16] and the emergence of social structures
such as dominance hierarchies [17-20] and coalitions
[18,21-24]. Also, turn-taking was not included in socio-
ecological models that explain the emergence of egalitar-
ian and despotic societies based only on contest and
scramble competition [4-6]. Nevertheless, turn-taking
might be an important determinant of social structures.
Specifically it could be a previously unrecognized mechan-
ism for the emergence of egalitarian societies [7]. How-
ever, currently it is largely unclear whether turn-taking
should be integrated in socio-ecological models because it
is not well understood under which conditions turn-taking
can evolve.
Crowley [7] found that the evolution of cooperative
turn-taking in his model is favoured if costs of fights are
not very high and if individuals are not able to assess
each other’s fighting abilities (or when individuals have
very similar fighting abilities, see also [25]). However,
these findings were based on models in which fighting
costs and the assessment of the opponent’s fighting abil-
ities are fixed attributes of a species. As shown by Enquist
and Leimar [26] costs and assessment are not necessarily
fixed, because they can depend on evolved within-fight
behaviour. In their “sequential assessment game” Enquist
and Leimar [26] assumed that in the course of a fight,
individuals assess each other’s strength and give up when
they are certain to be weaker. While longer persistence in
fights allows a better assessment of fighting abilities, it
also increases fighting costs. Based on these assumptions
Enquist and Leimar [26] found that the evolution of
within-fight behaviour depended (among other factors)
on the value of the contested resource. Accordingly,
lower resource values resulted in shorter fights that are
less costly and allow an inferior assessment of fighting
abilities. Given these findings we might expect that turn-
taking evolves when the value of the limited resource is
small.
However, this expectation could be wrong because in the
model of Enquist and Leimar [26] within-fight behaviour
evolves independently of any higher-level strategy, such as
the turn-taking, or the contest strategy found by Crowley
[7]. Enquist and Leimar assumed that individuals do not
adjust their behaviour based on past experiences. In con-
trast, if within-fight strategies evolve together with higher-
level strategies, feedbacks between the two evolutionary
processes might change the dynamics that are expected
when both processes occur in isolation. To our knowledge
such feedback effects have never been investigated in mod-
els of animal conflict. Therefore, it is unknown whether
such feedback effects exist and what consequences they
could have. In this study we address this problem with an
evolutionary agent-based model. For this purpose we for-
mulate a model which is a hybrid of Crowley’s[ 7 ]a n d
Enquist and Leimar’s [26] models. Thus, we assumed that
individuals can recognize each other individually and are
able to react to experiences in conflicts by adjusting future
dyad-specific conflict behaviour. In addition, we assumed
that costs of fights and assessment of fighting abilities are
not fixed, but that they emerge from evolving within-fight
behaviour. In our model analysis we were particularly
interested in whether turn-taking can be evolutionarily
stable when evolving within-fight behaviour determines
fighting costs and assessment of fighting abilities.
2. Methods
2.1. Model description
The description of our model is based on the ODD pro-
tocol for describing individual- and agent-based models
[27,28]. In the following we provide an overview. Infor-
mation about details is included in Appendix A.
2.1.1. Purpose
The main purpose of this model was to explore the evo-
lution of conflict strategies at two different levels: (1)
how to behave in escalated conflicts (i.e. fighting beha-
viour in costly fights) and (2) how to adjust conflict beha-
viour in a series of conflicts (i.e. higher-level conflict
strategies). Specifically, we wanted to investigate whether
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(which occurs at the second level) can be evolutionarily
stable.
2.1.2. State variables and scales
We assume that individuals live in stable groups of equal
size. Each individual is characterized by its strength s
(which differs among individuals and influences fighting
costs) and fitness F. In addition, each individual i has a set
of dyad-specific variables wi,j that quantify the willingness
of i to escalate a conflict with group member j into a costly
fight. Individuals can adjust their dyad-specific willingness
to escalate based on the outcomes of conflicts. We assume
that a genetically determined update factor U regulates
how winning or losing changes the dyad-specific willing-
ness to escalate. In the case that costly fights occur, indivi-
duals make use of two additional variables: a decision
variable d, which contains information about their esti-
mated relative strength, and a genetically determined
threshold T, which determines when to give up.
2.1.3. Process overview and scheduling
Model dynamics include dynamics at three different time
scales: (1) evolutionary dynamics that occur over several
generations, (2) dynamics of repeated conflicts among
individuals of one generation and (3) if a conflict is esca-
lated into a costly fight then also within-fight dynamics
occur (figure 1). Evolutionary dynamics proceed in dis-
crete generations, in which three distinct phases occur:
repeated conflicts among group members (which deter-
mine the fitness of individuals), reproduction (which
includes fitness-dependent selection and mutation) and
death of parents and migration of offspring.
Dynamics of repeated conflicts proceed in distinct
rounds in which all dyads in a group enter a conflict over
a valuable resource. In each conflict only one individual
can obtain a resource and the associated fitness benefit.
When a conflict is escalated into a costly fight then both
individuals also incur fitness costs. Each conflict starts
with both individuals simultaneously deciding whether
they are willing to escalate the conflict into a costly fight.
The probability with which an individual i makes this deci-
sion regarding an individual j is given by the value of the
dyad-specific willingness to escalate wi,j,. We assume that
individuals make use of specific signals to communicate
their willingness to escalate the conflict (although this is
not an essential assumption). If neither individual is willing
to escalate, then one randomly chosen individual obtains
the resource. If only one individual is willing to escalate,
then this individual obtains the resource. In case both are
ready to escalate, a fight occurs in which both individuals
suffer costs and only the winner obtains the benefits.
Based on conflict outcomes, individuals adjust their future
behaviour by updating their willingness to escalate in the
next conflict wi,j (based on their update factor U).
Within-fight dynamics take place in discrete fighting
rounds in which individuals obtain noisy information
about their relative strength (the strength of noise is
determined by the values of its standard deviation sε)
and incur costs. The obtained information about relative
strength is integrated into the decision variable d that
measures the certainty of being weaker (which is mea-
sured independently of previous fights, i.e. starts out at
zero). An individual gives up when sufficiently certain to
be weaker (i.e. when the value of d increases above the
giving-up threshold T). The costs of a fight depend on
the relative strength of individuals (costs are higher for
the weaker individual) and the length of the fight (which
strongly depends on the genetically determined giving-up
threshold T). More details about the model are included
in Appendix A.
2.2. Model analysis
In the main analysis we focussed on a specific model
parameterization and explored model dynamics in more
detail in additional analyses that are provided in Appen-
dix B. In the main analysis the number of groups was set
to 1000 with 10 individuals per group, 10 conflict rounds
and an initial fitness of individuals of 100. The standard
deviation sε of errors in estimating the relative strength
in each fighting round was set to one. Simulations were
performed while systematically varying values for
resource benefits (from 1 to 10 in steps of 1) and initial
values of the update factor U (which was either set to -1
or 1). The initial value for the giving up threshold T was
set to zero in all simulations. Simulations for each para-
meter combination were repeated ten times (resulting in
a total of 200 simulations). Each simulation was run for
5000 generations. In the last generation of each simula-
tion we recorded the values of U and T of all individuals.
In addition, we recorded the length of all fights and cal-
culated the directional consistency index (DCI), which
measures directionality of a dyadic relationship [29], and
linearity of the hierarchy in each group [30]. The calcula-
tion of DCI and linearity was based on outcomes of con-
flicts in which at least one individual was ready to
escalate.
Our results revealed that two alternative strategies
evolved for small benefit values. To investigate whether
both strategies were evolutionarily stable, we performed
competition experiments to determine whether each
strategy could resist the invasion of the alternative strat-
egy. Two sets of experiments were performed in which
individuals were initialized with the means of evolved
parameters U and T for the two strategies. The first set
of experiments was based on parameters that evolved for
b e n e f i tv a l u e so fo n ea n dt h es e c o n ds e tw a sb a s e do n
parameters that evolved for benefit values of four. In
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two (with 100,000 groups), to show the effects of direct
competition in dyads, and group sizes of ten (with 20,000
groups), to reveal effects of indirect competition among
dyads. Different simulations were performed for different
frequencies of both strategies. For this purpose, in each
group we initialized the same number of individuals with
each strategy. Benefits were set to one and four in the
first and second set, respectively. For each group size and
strategy frequency one simulation was run for one gen-
eration. At the end of each simulation we recorded the
mean fitness of individuals for each strategy.
3. Results
3.1 Evolutionary dynamics
Simulated evolutionary dynamics differed between small
and large values of resource benefits. While for large
benefits, all simulations led to similar evolutionary out-
comes, for small benefits two distinct evolutionary out-
comes emerged (figure 2 a, b). Based on emerging
behavioural dynamics we refer to these distinct out-
comes as contest and turn-taking strategies.
The contest strategy is characterized by positive values
of the update factor U (figure 2 a) and high values of the
giving-up threshold T (figure 2 b). At positive values of U
winning a conflict leads to an increase in willingness to
escalate the next conflict with the loser and losing leads
to a decrease in willingness to escalate the next conflict
with the winner (for more information on the effects of
U see Appendix A). Based on this effect, stable domi-
nance relationships emerge in which only the dominant
individual is willing to escalate in conflicts and thus
always obtain the resource. This behavioural pattern
leads to very high values of the directional consistency
index (DCI) (figure 2 c). The high giving-up threshold of
the contest strategy has the effect that individuals collect
substantial evidence for being weaker before giving up in
an escalated fight. Therefore, the contest strategy leads to
relatively long (and costly) fights (figure 2 d). Higher
giving-up thresholds also increase the likelihood for
stronger individuals to win fights and thus to become
dominant. Therefore, the high giving-up threshold of the
contest strategy result in the establishment of linear hier-
archies (figure 2 e). With increasing resource benefits the
giving-up threshold T of the contest strategy increase,
which results in increased fight lengths and increased lin-
earity of the hierarchy. The update factor U decreases
with increasing benefits, which has the effect that dyads
do not resolve dominance in a single fight. Instead, sev-
eral fights with consistent outcomes are required to
establish stable relationships. Therefore, even individuals
that are only slightly stronger than their opponent have a
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Figure 1 Overview of model dynamics that proceed on three different timescales: evolutionary dynamics, (2) dynamics in repeated
conflicts and (3) within-fight dynamics, which are nested in each other.
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to increasing hierarchy linearity with increasing benefits.
The turn-taking strategy is characterized by strongly
negative values of the update factor U (figure 2 a) and
low values of the giving-up threshold T (figure 2 b). At
negative values of U winning a conflict leads to a
decrease in willingness to escalate in the next conflict
with the loser, and losing leads to an increase in willing-
ness to escalate the next conflict with the winner. In the
turn-taking strategy this effect is so strong, that interac-
tion patterns emerge in which in each conflict one indivi-
dual behaves dominantly (because it is willing to escalate)
and the other behaves subordinately (because it is not
willing to escalate). Importantly, these roles switch in
each subsequent conflict because the “dominant”
individual won and thus decreases its dyad-specific will-
ingness to escalate to zero (or very close to zero) and the
“subordinate” individual increases its willingness to one
(or very close to one). As a result of this emerging alter-
nating pattern, DCI values are very low (figure 2 c) and
no linear hierarchies emerge (figure 2 e). Because the
values of the giving-up threshold are very low, individuals
give up very quickly and fights are short (figure 2 d).
3.2. Competition experiments
Results of the competition experiments reveal why the
two different strategies are evolutionarily stable and why
the turn-taking strategy only evolves for small benefit
values. When the two strategies compete with each
other in dyads, the contest strategy obtains on average a
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Figure 2 Evolved parameters (a, b) and resulting behavioural dynamics (c, d, e). For small resource values two distinct evolutionary
outcomes occur, which correspond to turn-taking (black dots) and contest strategies (grey dots). The evolution of a positive update factor U (a)
results in the establishment of stable subordinate-dominant relationships, which are characterized by high values of the directional consistency
index (DCI) (c). In contrast, the evolution of a negative update factor U leads to the establishment of alternating dominant-subordinate
relationships, which are characterized by low DCI values (c). Higher evolved values of the giving-up threshold T (b) result in longer fights (d). This
increases the likelihood that stronger individuals win (figure 4 in Appendix A), which leads to more linear hierarchies (e).
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b). The costs and benefits for individuals of each strat-
egy strongly depend on the strength differences between
competing individuals. Nevertheless, because individuals
with the contest strategy are more persistent in fights
(due to a higher giving-up threshold), they are able to
obtain the resource on average more often than turn-
taking individuals. Therefore, in direct competition with
the contest strategy the turn-taking strategy had a disad-
vantage. However, when turn-taking individuals compete
with each other they achieve a higher average fitness
than individuals with the contest strategy (figure 3 a, b).
This happens because individuals with the turn-taking
strategy rarely engage in fights with each other (usually
only when they entered a conflict for the first time) and
if they did fights are very short (figure 2 d) and not very
costly. Together, this leads to frequency-dependent
effects on the fitness of alternative strategies (figure 3 c,
d). If the number of turn-taking individuals in a group
is low then contest individuals achieve on average a
higher fitness than turn-taking individuals, because
turn-taking individuals mostly encounter contest indivi-
duals. The opposite effect emerges when the number of
turn-taking individuals is high. The fitness advantages
that turn-taking individuals gain in conflicts with indivi-
duals of their own strategy outweigh the disadvantages
they incur in conflicts with contest individuals. Due to
the frequency-dependent fitness, evolutionary dynamics
result in a positive feedback on the frequency of each
strategy and prevent the invasion of the alternative strat-
egy. In other words, the social behaviour of each strat-
egy is able to create a social environment that favours
its own strategy and thus makes both strategies evolu-
tionarily stable.
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Figure 3 Results of competition experiments. Mean fitness of contest (grey) and turn-taking (black) strategies that evolved for benefit values
of one (a, c) and four (b,d). (a,b) in groups of size two (which illustrates effects of direct competition in dyads) and ten (which are conditions
under which these strategies evolved). For each group all possible frequencies of the two strategies were investigated (the number of
individuals with the turn-taking strategy increases from the left to the right).
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becomes more successful because individuals with this
strategy achieve increasing fitness advantages in direct
competition with turn-taking individuals (compare figure
3a, b). Therefore, for benefit values of four the turn-taking
strategy is only more successful if the frequencies of turn-
taking individuals are very high (compare figure 3 c, d).
This effect can be also described as a decreasing potential
of the turn-taking strategy to create a social environment
that favours its own strategy, which explains why the turn-
taking strategy does not evolve for benefit values larger
than four (figure 2).
3.3. Additional analyses
We found that the results reported above remain qualita-
tively unchanged when changing the number of indivi-
duals in groups, the number of conflicts and the standard
deviation of errors in estimating relative strength (Appen-
dix B for more details). In addition, the range of benefit
values under which the turn-taking strategy evolves
increase with increasing observation errors, a decreasing
number of contest rounds and an increasing number of
individuals per group. These effects emerge because varia-
tions in the investigated parameters change the effective-
ness with which the stronger individual in each dyad can
be identified. Generally, a decreasing ability to identify the
stronger individual favours the evolutionary stability of the
turn-taking strategy.
4. Discussion
Using an evolutionary agent-based model we investi-
gated the evolution of conflict behaviour defined at two
different levels: (1) how to behave during escalated con-
flicts (i.e. costly fights) and (2) how to adjust conflict
behaviour in a series of conflicts. This approach extends
previous approaches to model the evolution of conflict
behaviour that focus on only one of these levels.
In agreement with findings of Crowley [7], we found
that two distinct behavioural strategies evolve: a contest
strategy and a turn-taking strategy. While the contest
strategy leads to stable dominance relationships, the
turn-taking strategy leads to dyadic interaction patterns
in which individuals constantly switch roles of who is
dominant and subordinate. Thus, both strategies func-
tion to coordinate interactions to avoid costly fights but
they do so in different ways. Also in agreement with
findings of Enquist and Leimar [26], we observed that
for the contest strategy increasing benefits lead to more
persistent within-fight behaviour, as indicated by higher
values of the giving-up threshold T (figure 2 b). How-
ever, for the turn-taking strategy we did not find this
pattern. Instead, we found that turn-taking is always
associated with very short persistence in escalated fights,
independently of resource benefits (figure 2 b).
T h ed i f f e r e n c ei nw i t h i n - fight behaviour between
contest and turn-taking strategies emerges because esca-
lated fights evolve to have different purposes in both
strategies. Contest individuals use fights to identify
opponent strength. The stronger individual in each dyad
then becomes dominant, which enables coordinated
interactions that avoid costlyf i g h t s .H i g h e rg i v i n g - u p
thresholds reduce the chance that the stronger indivi-
dual erroneously assumes itself to be weaker and gives
up (figure 4 in Appendix A). Therefore, contest indivi-
duals benefit from higher giving-up thresholds. How-
ever, higher thresholds also lead to longer, more costly
fights. The evolution of within-fight behaviour in contest
individuals evolves according to a trade-off between
opponent assessment and fighting costs. With increasing
benefit values, individuals can invest in more costly
within-fight behaviour, which explains why for the con-
test strategy the giving-up threshold increases with
increasing resource benefits.
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Figure 4 Examples of decision making processes during fights.
Black and grey lines depict two separate, independent fights. In the
first fight (black data) the strength difference between both
individuals (si -s j) was set to 1, and in the second fight (grey data)
it was set to 0.3. In both fights the stronger individual is
represented by a dashed line and the weaker one by a solid line. In
each fighting round both individuals obtain a noisy estimation of
their relative strength. This estimation is subtracted in each round
from the decision variable d (on the y-axis), which measures the
evidence of being weaker. Therefore, the decision variable of
stronger individuals (dashed lines) tends to decrease over time and
for weaker individuals it (solid lines) tends to increase. An individual
is certain to be weaker and gives up when the value of d increases
above the genetically determined giving-up threshold T, which in
these examples is assumed to be three for all individuals (dotted
line). The increase or decrease in the decision variable d is not
always consistent because of the noise in the estimation of relative
strength. In addition, the development of d strongly depends on
the strength difference between both individuals. Thus, on average
a smaller strength difference leads to longer fights as indicated by
the differences in fight between black (3 rounds) and grey data (13
rounds). Also note that a higher giving-up threshold leads on
average to longer fights, but also to a lower risk that the stronger
individual erroneously becomes certain to be weaker and gives up.
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However, these fights are not used to assess opponent
strength. Instead they trigger a pattern of behaviour
alternation that ensures an equal partitioning of
resources. Because accurate assessment of fighting abil-
ities is irrelevant for turn-taking individuals, they do not
face the same trade-off as contest individuals. This
explains why the turn-taking strategy is associated with
very low giving-up thresholds, independently from
resource benefits.
For low resource values both strategies are possible, but
mutually exclusive, evolutionary outcomes. The above
described feedback between the evolution of higher-level
conflict strategies and within-fight behaviour is a crucial
determinant for this outcome. At low benefit values, evo-
lutionary stability of each strategy emerges because of
frequency-dependent effects (figure 3). Both strategies
are very efficient in same-strategy interactions because
after initial fights conflicts are resolved by ritualized
interactions (in which only one of the two individuals sig-
nals willingness to escalate). In contrast, interactions
between the two alternative strategies often result in on-
going costly fights because turn-taking, but not contest
individuals, constantly try to switch roles of dominant
and subordinate (resulting in costly fights for both
individuals).
With increasing benefit values this frequency-depen-
dent effect falls more in favour of the contest strategy,
because the contest strategy becomes increasingly suc-
cessful in direct interactions with the turn-taking strategy
(figure 3 a, b). Increasing benefits lead to increasing dif-
ference in giving-up thresholds between the turn-taking
strategy and the contest strategy (figure 2 b). Large differ-
ences in giving-up thresholds increase the chance that
contest individuals win fights, because contest individuals
only give-up when being very certain to be weaker. How-
ever, turn-taking individuals give up much more quickly.
Therefore, the contest strategy becomes increasingly suc-
cessful in direct interactions with turn-taking individuals
(figure 3 a, b). At large benefits the success of contest
individuals increases so strongly that the frequency-
dependent effects that stabilize turn-taking completely
disappear and turn-taking is no longer evolutionarily
stable.
Taken together, our results emphasize that the evolu-
tion of within-fight behaviour and the evolution of
higher-level conflict strategies can crucially influence
each other. Specifically, turn-taking is only stable for
small-benefit values because with increasing benefits, the
contest strategy, but not the turn-taking strategy, evolves
more persistent within-fight behaviour, which makes the
contest strategy more successful. This feedback between
within-fight behaviour and higher-level conflict strategies
could also influence other conflict strategies such as
winner-loser effects (which are not restricted to dyadic
interactions as the strategies in our model) [14,20,31],
eavesdropping [12] or coalition formation [18,21-24].
However, only few models have been used to explore the
evolution of within-fight behaviour [26,32] and we are
not aware of any study that explored feedbacks between
the evolution of within-fight behaviour and higher-level
conflict strategies.
Furthermore, more theoretical and empirical studies
would be helpful to assess our model assumptions and to
develop improved models. Important points to address
include assumptions about within-fight dynamics (e.g.
how individuals decide to give up), which information
gained in fights is used in higher-level strategies (e.g. only
whether an individual lost or won, or also how long a fight
lasted) and how these strategies in turn affect within-fight
behaviour (e.g. should only the willingness to escalate be
updated or also the giving-up threshold). In addition,
instead of assuming equally frequent interactions among
all group members, future studies could allow that interac-
tion patterns emerge from self-organization processes [31].
4.1. Implications for socio-ecological models
It has been suggested that if contest potential exceeds a
certain threshold then individuals will always rely on con-
test competition and form despotic societies with clear
dominance relationships and linear hierarchies [5]. Our
results contradict the assumption that a clear threshold
exists for the emergence of despotic societies. We found
that the turn-taking and the contest strategy are both
evolutionarily stable for small benefits. This suggested
that under these conditions despotic and egalitarian
societies are both possible. To determine whether turn-
taking should be included in socio-ecological theories
requires investigating whether this strategy is indeed
used by animals. Laboratory experiments revealed that
animals and humans are able to use turn-taking strategies
[33,34]. However, in the context of regulating access to
limited, monolpolizable resources, we are not aware of
any study that has tried to look for, nor found, any evi-
dence of turn-taking.
The existence of turn-taking might have been over-
looked because it produces similar social patterns as
expected when individuals compete via scramble competi-
tion. It has been argued that individuals that compete via
scramble competition would occasionally engage in con-
text-dependent, short fights, which lead to unclear domi-
nance relationships and non-linear hierarchies [4]. These
are the same characteristics that emerge from the turn-
taking strategy in our model (figure 2 c, d, e). Distinguish-
ing turn-taking from context-dependent fights could be
possible by investigating dyadic interaction patterns on
small time scales. If animals compete mainly via scramble
competition and only engage in context-dependent fights
Franz et al. BMC Evolutionary Biology 2011, 11:323
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interactions. In contrast, turn-taking should result in
much more ordered patterns of these interactions. One
possible way to test for such differences is to fit alternative
Markov models to observed interaction sequences (e.g.
[33]).
5. Conclusions
We found that turn-taking is evolutionarily stable for
small benefit values despite strength differences among
individuals, and the possibility for good assessment of
fighting abilities. In our model, the lack of opponent-
assessment during fights is not imposed as assumed by
Crowley [7]. Instead, the lack of assessment in the turn-
taking strategy is an evolved behavioural feature, which
evolves even when opponent assessment is possible. This
suggests that the evolution of turn-taking can be expected
under a broader range of conditions than previously
thought. For animals that are in principle able to assess
fighting abilities of opponents, our model suggests that
turn-taking could be used to partition low value resources.
However, to our knowledge this has never been tested.
Analyses of temporal interaction patterns could be used to
test whether turn-taking occurs in animals.
Our finding of feedbacks between the evolution of
within-fight behaviour and the evolution of higher-level
conflict strategies contradicts the common assumption
that within-fight behaviour and higher-level conflict
strategies evolve independently of each other. Similar
feedbacks might be important for the evolution of other
conflict strategies such as winner-loser effects or coali-
tions. However, we are not aware of any study that has
investigated such feedbacks.
Appendix A: Model details
Evolutionary dynamics
Individuals are assumed to reproduce asexually, which
involves two separate processes: (1) selecting individuals
for reproduction based on their fitness and (2) creating
offspring, which includes mutation of evolving para-
meters U (update factor) and T (giving-up threshold).
Selection of individuals for reproduction is performed
separately in each group. The number of reproduction
events in each group equals the number of individuals
(of the parent generation) in each group. Each time one
individual of the parent generation is chosen for repro-
duction. Selection is assumed to be a probabilistic pro-
cess that depends on the relative fitness of individuals.
For each reproduction event, the probability Pi that indi-
vidual i is selected is given by:
Pi =
Fi 
j
Fj (1)
where Fi and Fj are the fitness values of individuals i
and j. The summation over j includes all individuals of
the parent generation in the group. (Any negative fitness
values are set to zero before selection processes are
started.) Each reproduction event results in the genera-
tion of an offspring individual, which inherits the para-
meters U and T from the selected parent. Additionally,
mutation takes place with probability 0.001. In case
mutation occurs, parameters U and T are assigned new
values, which are drawn from uniform distributions with
a minimum of minus one and maximum of one for U
and a minimum of zero and maximum of five for T.( I n
an earlier model version we assumed that mutations only
lead to small changes in parameter values; this, however,
did not affect the model outcomes). The initial fitness of
an offspring individual is set to a predefined value F0,i t s
strength is drawn from a uniform distribution with mini-
mum zero and maximum one and all values of the will-
ingness to escalate wi,j are set to one. After reproduction
takes place all individuals of the parent generation are
assumed to die. Thereafter, all individuals of the offspring
generation migrate to a randomly selected group (all
group sizes remain restricted to the predefined group
size, which also ensures that the number of groups
remains constant).
Dynamics of repeated conflicts
Dynamics in single conflicts consist of discrete time steps
in which individuals in a dyad simultaneously make deci-
sions how to proceed. The first decision determines
whether an individual is willing to escalate the conflict
into a costly fight. The probability that an individual i is
willing to escalate a conflict with another individual j is
g i v e nb yt h ev a l u eo fwi,j. If neither is willing to escalate
then one randomly chosen individual obtains the
resource and the associated benefits (and neither suffers
any costs). If only one individual decides to escalate, then
this individual obtains the benefit (and again neither suf-
fers any costs). In case that both are ready to escalate, a
fight occurs in which both individuals suffer costs
(according to their relative strength and the length of the
fight) and only the winner obtains the benefits (below a
detailed description of within-fight dynamics is
provided).
We assume that each individual i updates its dyad-
specific willingness to escalate wi,j based on the outcome
of a conflict with each other individual j.U p d a t i n go n l y
occurs when at least one individual is willing to escalate.
In this case, two outcomes are distinguished: (1) obtain-
ing the resource, which can be interpreted as winning,
and (2) not obtaining the resource, which can be inter-
preted as losing. We assume that a winner i updates its
willingness to escalate wi,j for a loser j based on its cur-
rent value wcur,i,j by:
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Page 9 of 14wi,j = wcur,i,j + Ui(1 − wcur,i,j) forUi > 0 (2)
and
wi,j = wcur,i,j + Uiwcur,i,j forUi < 0 (3)
where Ui is the genetically determined update factor
of individual i. The opposite effects are assumed for
losers. Thus, a loser i adjusts its escalation probability
wi,j for a winner j by:
wi,j = wcur,i,j − Uiwcur,i,j forUi > 0 (4)
and
wi,j = wcur,i,j − Ui(1 − wcur,i,j) forUi < 0 (5)
In addition, we assume that when Ui is zero, individuals
will not adapt future agonistic behaviours. Our assump-
tions furthermore imply that positive values of Ui will
have the effect that winners increase their escalation prob-
ability and losers decrease it (which can lead to the estab-
lishment of stable dominance relationships). Negative
values of Ui have the opposite effect (which can lead to
alternating roles of who appears to be dominant and
subordinate).
Note that we assume that winning and losing only
affects the dyad-specific willingness to escalate. More
general winner-loser effects [14,20,31] are not imple-
m e n t e d ,i . e .i ti sn o tp o s s ible that winning or losing
against one individual affects the willingness to escalate
a conflict with another individual.
Also note that we assume that winning or losing only
affects the willingness to escalate a conflict into a physical
fight, but it does not affect how individuals behave within
fights (i.e. the giving-up threshold T and the initial value
of the decision variable d are not affected). This means
that individuals do not integrate information of different
fights to obtain an overall estimate of relative strength
(which then might be used to decide whether to keep
escalating). Instead we assume that individuals only use
the 0-1 outcome of each fight (whether they estimated
themselves to be weaker) and integrate these outcomes
of different fights directly in the willingness to escalate.
In this way individuals can use information about their
relative strength from different fights to decide whether
to escalate without the necessity to obtain an overall esti-
mate of their relative strength.
Within-fight dynamics
Assumptions about within-fight dynamics are based on
the sequential assessment game [26]. The main idea is
that fights consist of multiple rounds in which each
individual (1) incurs costs, which depend on its relative
strength, (2) obtains noisy information about its relative
strength, and (3) decides whether to give up, which
happens when it is sufficiently certain to be weaker. The
calculation of costs is motivated by the assumption that
a weaker individual will incur greater costs. This might
happen because a stronger individual can inflict more
severe injuries to a weaker individual or because a
weaker individual needs to put more effort in defending
itself against a stronger opponent. We assumed that in
each fighting round the costs ci for individual i are
given by:
ci = e(sj−si) (6)
where si and sj are the strengths of individual i and its
opponent j. Equation 6 ensures that the costs of the
stronger individual are below one (but always stay above
zero) and the costs of the weaker individual are above
one (and equally matched opponents both incur costs of
one).
Our implementation of the decision making process is
based on the model of de Froment [32]. Thus, decision
making is based on a single decision variable d, which is
set to zero at the beginning of each fight and then
updated based on estimated strength difference. In each
fighting round r an individual i that fights against an
opponent j obtains an estimation of its relative strength
Δsi,j,r, which is given by
 si,j,r = si − sj + ε (7)
where si and sj are the strengths of both individuals
and ε corresponds to observation errors. In each fighting
round these errors are independently drawn for each
individual from a normal distribution with mean zero
and standard deviation sε.
If the observation error is relatively large then an accu-
rate estimation of relative strength can only be obtained
by pooling the estimations of several rounds. This pooling
is done by subtracting the estimated strength difference Δs
in each round from the decision variable d (figure 4, note
that this implementation differs from that of de Froment
[32] who adds the estimated strength difference to the
decision variable). Thus, the value of d can be interpreted
as the amount of evidence that has been collected that an
individual is weaker. Subtracting Δs from d has the effect
that estimations of being stronger (positive values of Δsi,j,r)
decrease the evidence of being weaker and estimations of
being weaker (negative values of Δsi,j,r)i n c r e a s et h ee v i -
dence of being weaker. Therefore, a positive value of di
provides evidence that an individual i is weaker and a
negative value suggest that i is stronger. The larger the
absolute value of d the more certain an individual can be
to be the weaker or stronger, respectively. It is assumed
that an individual i decides to give up fighting when its
value of di increases above its genetically determined
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that lower values of Ti lead to shorter fights because the
weaker individual tends to give up earlier, but it also
increases the risk that a stronger individual erroneously
assumes itself to be weaker and gives up. In addition, fight
length generally depends on strength difference of the
opponents with large differences resulting on average in
shorter fights and small differences resulting in longer
fights (figure 4).
In each fighting round both individuals decide simul-
taneously whether to give up. This allows three possible
outcomes: (1) neither gives up, which means the fights
continues, (2) only one individual gives up and thus
leaves the resource to the opponent, and (3) both give
up, in which case one of them is randomly chosen as
the winner who obtains the resource.
In each fighting round costs are subtracted from the
fitness of individuals. In case the fitness of an individual
drops below zero the individual is forced to give up in
this round. In addition, individuals with negative fitness
will set all their escalation probabilities wi,j to zero,
which prevents them from initiating any escalated fights
in the future.
Appendix B: Additional Analyses
Observation errors
To investigate how our results were affected by variation
of the standard deviation sε of errors in estimating rela-
tive strength, we performed additional simulations in
which the value of sε was set to 0.5 and 2. All other
parameter values and performed analyses were identical
to the description in section 2.2. ’Model Analyses’.
Changes of sε had a slight effect on evolved values of
the update factor U (figure 5 a, b) and a strong effect on
the evolved values of the giving-up threshold T (figure 5
c, d) for the contest strategy, but no apparent changes
occurred for evolved parameters of the turn-taking strat-
egy. In addition, increasing observation errors led to an
increase in the range of benefits for which the turn-tak-
ing strategy evolved (figure 5).
Lower values of T and U of the contest strategy com-
pensated higher observation errors and thus ensured the
reliable identification of the stronger individual in each
dyad. However, lower values of T led to longer and thus
more costly fights and lower values of U led on average
to more fights because individuals would more often
fight not only in the first conflict but also in subsequent
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Page 11 of 14conflicts before ‘agreeing’ on a stable dominance-subor-
dinate relationship.
The effectiveness of the contest strategy crucially
depended on identifying which individual in a dyad was
stronger. Larger observation errors made this process
more costly and thus reduced the selection advantage of
the contest strategy when it competed with the turn-tak-
ing strategy. In contrast, the turn-taking strategy did not
depend on the identification of stronger individuals and
thus was not affected by changes in observation errors.
Taken together these effects explain why the turn-taking
strategy evolved under a broader range of benefit values
when observation errors were large.
Number of conflicts
To investigate how our results were affected by variation
in the number of conflicts, we performed additional
simulations with number of conflict rounds set to 4 and
40. All other parameter values and performed analyses
were identical to the description in section 2.2. ‘Model
Analyses’.
Changes in the number of conflict rounds had a strong
effect on evolved values of the update factor U (figure 6
a, b) and a slight effect on the evolved values of the giv-
ing-up threshold T (figure 6 c, d) for the contest strategy,
but no apparent changes occurred for evolved parameters
of the turn-taking strategy. In addition, increasing the
number of conflicts led to a decrease in the range of ben-
efits for which the turn-taking strategy evolved (figure 6).
Individuals with the contest strategy escalated initial
conflicts to costly fights to identify the stronger individual
(who then became dominant). Thus, these initial conflicts
were costly investments for the establishment of stable
subordinate-dominance relationships. Investing a lot
would ensure that the stronger individual is always identi-
fied (also when strength differences are small). However,
larger investments would be also more costly. Evolutionary
dynamics were finding optimized solutions for this trade
off. How much individuals invested initially depended on
how much they could gain later in their relationships.
These gains increased with the number of conflict rounds.
Therefore, larger investments were made when the num-
ber of conflict rounds was large, which is reflected by the
lower values of U (which led to more frequent fights) and
higher values of T (which led to longer fights).
Larger initial investments of the contest strategy for a
larger number of conflict rounds increased the effective-
ness of the contest strategy. In contrast, the turn-taking
strategy remained unaffected by changes in the number
of conflicts, which explains why this strategy evolved
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Page 12 of 14under a narrower range of benefit values when the num-
ber of conflict rounds was large.
Group size
To investigate how our results were affected by variation
of group size, we performed additional simulations with
group sizes of 5 and 20. All other parameter values and
performed analyses were identical to the description in
section 2.2. ’Model Analyses’.
Changes in group size affected the evolution of the
update factor U (figure 7 a, b) and the giving-up thresh-
old T (figure 7 c, d) for the contest strategy, but no
apparent changes occurred for evolved parameters of the
turn-taking strategy. In addition, increasing group size
led to an increase in the range of benefits for which the
turn-taking strategy evolved (figure 7).
At the first glance it might seem to be surprising that
changes in group size led to changes in the evolution of
the contest strategy given that all other parameters were
held constant. The reason why these changes occurred in
larger groups was an increased chance that two individuals
of similar strength entered conflicts (because individual
strength was drawn from a fixed distribution independent
of group size). Smaller strength differences made it harder
to identify the stronger individual in a dyad. Smaller
differences generally led to longer and thus more costly
fights (figure 4). This effect could be counterbalanced by a
decrease in the giving-up threshold (which would lead to
shorter fights) or an increase in the update factor (which
would lead to less frequent fights). However, these changes
would also result in a decreased likelihood to correctly
identify the stronger individual in each dyad. Again evolu-
tionary dynamics were optimizing this trade off in a way
that with increasing group size the update factor and also
the giving-up threshold decreased (figure 7), which led to
shorter but more frequent fights.
Similar to the effects of increasing observation errors and
decreasing the number of contests, larger groups decreased
the effectiveness of the contest strategy, while the turn-tak-
ing strategy remained unaffected. This explains why an
increasing group size allowed the turn-taking strategy to
evolve under a broader range of benefit values.
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